Cracks or rupture

A summary of a roundtable discussion held on 26 November 2025.

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Varða, in cooperation with Dagur B. Eggertsson, Member of Parliament and chair of the Icelandic delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, convened a roundtable on 28 January on defence agreements and defence cooperation. In the background were recent addresses in Davos and the tension created by threats from the US administration towards Greenland and Denmark, and threats of tariff increases against eight allied nations. The central question of the roundtable was what conclusions can be drawn at this point about the strengths of, and cracks in, the main pillars of Iceland's security and defence. Discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule.

The pillars: one, two, or more?

The discussion opened with the observation that it is not useful to view NATO membership and the bilateral defence agreement with the United States as two separate pillars. The pillars are difficult to separate, since the credibility of both depends on the interests and will of the administration in Washington at any given time. The situation now is that Iceland cannot rely on the United States in the same way as before, and it is a weak position for the country to be as dependent on political winds in Washington as it evidently is.

If it is more accurate to speak of the defence agreement and NATO membership as a single pillar, it was also noted that new pillars are taking shape as defence matters increasingly move into more regional channels. Participants considered whether cooperation such as NORDEFCO and the JEF, along with security and defence cooperation with the institutions of the European Union (EU), could become a second pillar.

There was general agreement that uncertainty has grown over how reliable US defence guarantees towards Europe are, but participants disagreed on how deep the cracks run in the Icelandic context. Two main approaches could be discerned in the discussion.

One approach held that cracks certainly exist, but that “the chair is not broken”. There is still broad support within the US system of government and in US politics for cooperation across the Atlantic, even if the same may not hold for the US president's closest associates. Defence guarantees towards Iceland would hold as long as the US administration considered them to be in its interest. Iceland's geographic and military position is such that the United States continues to have an interest in honouring its commitments towards Iceland. Iceland is, for example, not in the same position as states on NATO's eastern flank, where the threat is closer, preparedness more costly, and new attitudes within the US administration raise questions about how the United States defines its interests and its relations with Europe and Russia.

The other approach held that a rupture had occurred in relations with the United States. If cracks appear in the alliance, they also appear in Iceland. What matters more is whether the authorities in Moscow and Beijing believe that US defence guarantees still stand. If they are not considered reliable on NATO's eastern flank, why should they be considered reliable in Iceland?

Likewise, there was general agreement that civil protection should be regarded as a foundational pillar of Iceland's security and defence. The main threats facing Iceland are not direct military operations but hybrid threats and sabotage. Domestic capabilities and resources are steadily growing and are crucial for meeting such threats when put to the test, and should it come to that, civil protection can also call the entire population to respond. International cooperation in this field and defence preparedness rest not least on cooperation with civilian institutions and the EU, rather than NATO, although the latter also matters.

Security beyond conventional defence needs attention

There was considerable agreement on the importance of not looking solely at military-technical threats. Icelanders need to understand how pressure could be brought to bear on the nation and its government, and how best to prepare. It was noted that economic security is ever more intertwined with traditional security.

An unexpected move would hardly be military in nature; it would more likely take the form of economic coercion, opaque interference in domestic affairs or other kinds of political pressure. Another risk mentioned relates to the annex to the defence agreement, which contains authorisations for the US authorities to take over Icelandic airspace under defined circumstances, though it is difficult to assess how such authorisations would be applied or misapplied in practice.

Furthermore, given how closely recent actions by the US administration align with the country's newly published national security strategy, participants considered whether propaganda or coercion aimed at domestic matters could be expected, for example in connection with elections or on issues such as whaling, gender equality and the right to abortion. It was also raised whether attempts might be made to buy people's support, similar to what has been attempted in Greenland.

The tension: standing up for values or keeping a low profile

When the discussion turned to how the Icelandic government should conduct itself amid the current upheaval, a tension emerged over whether it is wiser to keep a low profile and avoid adding to tension in an unstable international system, or whether the government should take a firmer stand, grounded in the values on which Iceland's foreign policy is built and the values on which NATO's founding treaty rests.

In this context, it was pointed out on the one hand that no state in Europe any longer frames its policy in terms of intending to “keep a low profile”. On the other hand, it was stressed that Iceland's position is different: its closeness to the United States is greater and Iceland is also more dependent on military cooperation with it, which calls for a more cautious approach. Although a tension exists, these two approaches do not necessarily exclude each other. It is possible to keep a low profile while also preparing so as to be able to respond firmly when needed.

There was strong agreement that the key is to focus on what can be changed in Iceland, rather than spending too much energy trying to understand Trump. The conversation should revolve around what needs to be done at home: what is missing, what do we want, and how the government speaks to the public about what lies ahead.

There was fairly broad agreement that it would be useful if Icelandic officials pushed back more firmly than has been customary over the years in dealings with their counterparts in Washington.

Trusting the public builds trust in government

There was also broad agreement that the government could trust the public more with information on security and defence. It was mentioned that secrecy surrounding the annex to the defence agreement had, among other things, meant that Icelanders are not accustomed to taking part in that debate.

Relatedly, there was agreement that the Icelandic government should publish the threat assessment underpinning the new security and defence policy. It was noted that such an assessment should rightly have been publicly available before the policy was presented, so that the policy's premises would be clearer to the public. There was also agreement that the government should make an action plan, based on the policy, accessible to the public. Finally, the discussion turned to reforms of the institutional architecture of security and defence in Iceland, including the need for a robust debate on the institutional design now taking shape.