The grey zone
Russian sabotage, infrastructure and Iceland
Europe's security environment has changed significantly since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Sabotage against civilian infrastructure has become a fixture of Russian foreign policy, deployed deliberately in the grey zone between war and peace. The aim is to disrupt the functioning of societies, create uncertainty and raise costs without triggering a conventional military response. A new…
Europe's security environment has changed significantly since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Sabotage against civilian infrastructure has become a fixture of Russian foreign policy, deployed deliberately in the grey zone between war and peace. The aim is to disrupt the functioning of societies, create uncertainty and raise costs without triggering a conventional military response.
A new report from Varða shows that confirmed and suspected acts of Russian sabotage in Europe increased by 246% between 2023 and 2024, and the trend continued in 2025. The operations are often cheap and technically simple, exploit vulnerabilities in interconnected systems, and involve the use of intermediaries, including organised
crime. The report draws on data from the London-based think tank the International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS.
The report analyses this development and places it in an Icelandic context. It finds that Iceland is not exempt. The country's geographic isolation increases its vulnerability owing to a lack of redundancy in key infrastructure, particularly in energy and telecommunications systems. Iceland's geographic location alone provides no protection against targeted sabotage.
The report also notes that the growth of organised crime in Iceland creates conditions that actors can exploit to carry out sabotage indirectly. Such methods complicate detection, delay responses and blur accountability.
The report's findings show that Iceland's current legal framework is insufficient to respond to this threat picture. Defence cooperation and Iceland's membership of NATO provide protection against military attack, but less so against grey-zone operations.
The report proposes three main priorities for strengthening domestic capability:
- First, the adoption of comprehensive security legislation that defines critical infrastructure, clarifies the responsibilities of operators, ensures the proper handling of sensitive information, and provides a clear mandate for oversight and intervention.
- Second, targeted investment in infrastructure and in the government's analytical and response capabilities to increase security and resilience and to expand redundancy.
- Third, increased coordination and cooperation between the government, infrastructure operators and security authorities, both domestically and in cooperation with allies.
The conclusion is clear. We must strengthen civilian infrastructure, clarify chains of responsibility and build domestic capability in order to reduce Iceland's vulnerability to sabotage and related grey-zone operations.
Translated from the Icelandic original — read it here.